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In his essay "Kenosis and Emptiness," Buddhist scholar Masao Abe states that "the 
necessity of tackling the Buddhist-Christian dialogue not merely in terms of interfaith 
dialogue, but also as an inseparable part of the wider sociocultural problem of reli- 
gion versus irreligion has become more and more pressing in the past few decades." 1 
From Keiji Nishitani's perspective a culture of self-centeredness has developed out 
of the inability of many people to move beyond a sense of nihilism in their lives. 
Furthermore, technological advances and an increased understanding of the laws of 
nature have allowed humans to manipulate those laws for their own purposes. In 
this development, Nishitani believes that "the perversion that occurred in the origi- 
nal relationship of man to the laws of nature has taken the shape of a fundamental 
intertwining of the mechanization of man and his transformation i to a subject in 
pursuit of its desires, at the ground of which nihility has opened up as a sense of the 
meaninglessness of the whole business." 2 
Both Nishitani and Karl Rahner see in the development of science and technol- 
ogy a tendency to manipulate the laws of nature for one's own benefit in a way that 
increases the self-centeredness and self-absorption of humankind while at the same 
time devaluing humanity and engendering an attitude of meaninglessness. In a world 
today that is confronted with issues such as war and global warming and in which 
religious communities are trying to make sense out of scientific issues such as stem 
cell research and cloning, the ability to address a nihilistic standpoint that sees the 
surrounding world as simply being at human disposal has never been more crucial. 
So how does one confront this crisis of a nihilistic culture? Abe recommends that 
both Buddhism and Christianity need "to pursue a fundamental reorganization in 
characterizing their faith such that the prevailing basic assumptions are drastically 
changed-for example, a revolutionary reinterpretation of the concept of God in 
Christianity and the concept of Emptiness in Buddhism-thereby allowing a new 
paradigm or model of understanding to emerge."3 The concept of emptiness or 
nothingness in Keiji Nishitani's Religion and Nothingness and the concept of God 
as incomprehensible mystery in the theology of Karl Rahner4 could allow for the 
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emergence of a model of understanding that addresses the problem of irreligion or 
nihility from an interreligious perspective.' While in no way negating the very real 
dissimilarities between the concepts of Nishitani and Rahner or the respective reli- 
gious traditions of which they are a part, one need not think of their concepts as 
diametrically opposed to one another in such a way that dialogue is impossible. To 
that effect, his essay will explore the common ground between Nishitani's concept 
of sunyatd6 (often translated or defined as kulemptiness or mu/nothingness) and 
Rahner's incomprehensible God based on their interpretations f the human experi- 
ence of meaninglessness and the need for a surrender ofthe self that manifests itself in 
one's loving relationship with others. Common human experience, such as the expe- 
rience of death or meaninglessness, and the interpretations f that experience found 
in various religions can provide ground from which to begin interreligious dialogue. 
One can search for a connection between the religious concepts by looking at the way 
they make sense out of a common affective experience without requiring an absolute 
identity between the cognitive religious concepts themselves.8 The important point 
of comparison isnot manufacturing a false identity between the concepts, but the 
way the concepts work within the living communities tomove one to volitive action. 
In this way the practical or ethical implications ofthe concepts and how they are lived 
out in the world become the focus. In the work of Nishitani and Rahner, that com- 
mon human experience isthe meaninglessness ncountered inthe world today and 
the call for a selfless love that will transcend such meaninglessness. In their oles as 
philosopher-theologians, both Nishitani and Rahner have probably had more influ- 
ence on individuals or leaders within certain Buddhist and Christian communities 
rather than by having specific living communities that are founded on or dedicated 
to their thought.9 Working out the practical or ethical implications of their thought 
thus shows how they can continue to be relevant to communities of faith today. 
EMPTINESS IN THE THOUGHT OF KEIJI NISHITANI 
Nishitani's understanding ofemptiness or absolute nothingness inhis book Religion 
and Nothingness1o canbe explicated by looking at how Nishitani understands the 
human experience of nihility, how he sees emptiness as a reality that grounds even 
the experience of nihility, and finally the resultant need for an understanding ofthe 
non-self. Nishitani speaks of the experience of nihility as an existential of human 
existence. The experience of nihility ispart of what it means to be human, and it is 
the point at which one can begin the religious quest. Nishitani describes nihility as 
"that which renders meaningless the meaning of life. When we become a question 
to ourselves and when the problem of why we exist arises, this means that nihility 
has emerged from the ground of our existence and that our very existence has turned 
into a question mark." ii At this point of meaninglessness one questions the purpose 
of life and of human existence. Nishitani attributes this experience and the deepen- 
ing of awareness that results from the experience to the common human experience 
of death. He states that "our life runs up against death at its every step; we keep one 
foot planted in the vale of death at all times. Our life stands poised at the brink of the 
28 
This content downloaded from 147.126.10.37 on Thu, 14 May 2015 18:52:26 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
KEIJI NISHITANI AND KARL RAHNER 
abyss of nihility to which it may return at any moment. Our existence is an existence 
at one with non-existence, swinging back and forth over nihility, ceaselessly passing 
away and ceaselessly gaining its existence. This is what is called the 'incessant becom- 
ing' of existence." 12 
It is precisely when one runs up against the frailty of human existence, the real- 
ization that life can end much more quickly than it began, that one begins to ques- 
tion whether or not life is meaningful. For Nishitani, this experience of death and 
finiteness causes a void or an abyss to appear, in the face of which "not one of all the 
things that had made up the stuff of life until then is of any use." 13 Everything that 
has given one's life meaning up to that point suddenly ceases to be meaningful as one 
looks at the gaping hole of nonexistence on whose brink one stands. It is at this point, 
Nishitani maintains, that all things lose their necessity and utility.'" One no longer 
asks the purpose of things for oneself-that is, in what way are they necessary and 
useful to me-but rather one begins to ask what is one's own purpose."5 This ques- 
tion that one is, for Nishitani, is the beginning of the religious quest. To stop at the 
point of the yawning abyss of meaninglessness is nihilism, but Nishitani insists that 
one must look to that which grounds even the abyss of nihilism, absolute nothing- 
ness or sunyata. 
In the glossary of the English translation of Nishitani's Religion and Nothingness, 
Jan Van Bragt defines emptiness or fnyata as follows: "In accord with the image sug- 
gested by the Chinese character, it is said to be 'skylike' and is compared in the text to 
an all-encompassing cosmic sky." 16 In Religion and Nothingness Nishitani uses both 
"emptiness" and "absolute nothingness" to refer to this reality. According to Walden- 
fels, Nishitani eventually comes to replace the term "absolute nothingness" with the 
term "emptiness" in his work "in memory of" Nagarjuna.'7 To describe emptiness, 
it is first necessary to understand what emptiness is not. On the one hand, Nishitani 
maintains that emptiness is not a nihilistic, positivistic, or materialistic atheism.'8 
On the other hand, he also denies that it is theism or pantheism.'9 Nishitani objects 
to the fact that "'nothingness' is generally forced into a relationship with 'being' 
and made to serve as its negation, leading to its conception as something that 'is' 
nothingness because it 'is not' being."20 This understanding of nothingness would be 
nihilistic. Nishitani maintains that "insofar as one stops here, nothingness remains 
a concept, a nothingness only in thought. Absolute nothingness wherein even that 
is' is negated, is not possible as a nothingness that is thought but only a nothingness 
that is lived."21 For Nishitani nothingness must have ethical implications. However, 
despite these objections to a nothingness that is thought, unlike Nagarjuna, Nishitani 
does give a positive content to the understanding of nothingness. Nishitani describes 
emptiness as encompassing all things, including nihility. He states that "it is a cosmic 
sky enveloping the earth and man and countless legions of stars that move and have 
their being within it. It lies beneath the ground we tread, its bottom reaching beneath 
the valley's bottom. If the place where the omnipresent God resides be called heaven, 
then heaven would also have to reach beneath the bottomless pit of hell: heaven 
would be an abyss for hell. This is the sense in which emptiness is an abyss for the 
abyss of nihility."22 Going beyond Nishitani's definition, the term emptiness as it is 
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described here implies the concept of openness or space. This emptiness or openness 
holds all things within it. It is the womb of God that encompasses and makes room 
within it for that which is other. 
Nishitani himself, in his efforts to build a bridge between Eastern and Western 
thought, connects the idea of emptiness to Christian doctrine. Nishitani connects 
this understanding of selflessness or snyata to the nondifferentiating love of God 
in Christianity. He uses "the biblical analogy that tells us there is no such thing as 
selfish or selective sunshine"23 to describe such nondifferentiating love. As the sun 
shines on the good and the bad alike, so too does the love of God. He identifies this 
Christian analogy with the Great Compassionate Heart of Buddhism.24 By reason 
of this nondifferentiating love, Nishitani does not call God personal or impersonal 
but transpersonal, the ground of a personal relationship with God. He understands 
God as impersonally personal or personally impersonal, as an impersonal person or 
a personal nonperson.25 
The idea of sunyata grounds the idea of the transpersonal God. Sunyata is the 
field that provides the space for relationships of any kind, including the relationship 
between a person and God. He states, "it is only on the field of this same emptiness 
that God and man, and the relationships between them, are constituted in a per- 
sonal Form, and that their respective representations are made possible."26 Nishitani 
draws on Meister Eckhart's understanding of God and Godhead in order to make 
this distinction between God and the representation of God. The emptiness of God 
allows us to conceive of God in a personal way and to relate to that representation of 
God. Emptiness is that which is the most near to us and the most far from us, most 
personal and yet nondifferentiating. Nishitani uses the image of angles to describe it 
as the point where O0 is at the same time 3600, the point at which the absolute near 
side is also the absolute far side.27 
The idea of God making room for that which is other is also seen in Nishitani's 
understanding of the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. He understands this doc- 
trine in terms of the absolute distinctness of all things from God and their grounding 
in nihilum, yet at the same time being sustained in existence through God.28 Nishitani 
explains the omnipresence and absolute immanence of God through this doctrine of 
creation from nothing as that which makes God absolutely transcendent.29 Nishitani 
argues that "the God before whom all of creation is as nothing makes himself present 
through all of creation. The Christian must be able to pick up a single pebble or blade 
of grass and see the same consuming fire of God and the pillar of fire, hear the same 
thunderous roar, and feel the same 'fear and trembling' that Moses experienced."30 
The Christian does not experience this presence of God in a pantheistic way, as if 
the pebble or the blade of grass is God, but experiences God precisely because the 
pebble or blade of grass is not God, but is created by God. Nishitani explains that "the 
being of the created is grounded upon a nothingness and seen fundamentally to be a 
nothingness. At the same time, it is an immanence of absolute affirmation, for the 
nothingness of the created is the ground of its being. This is the omnipresence of God 
in all things that have their being as a creatio ex nihilo."31 The interdependence of 
absolute negation and absolute affirmation grounds the Christian's need and ability 
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to die to self and live in God.32 Such an understanding of the interdependence of all 
things grounded in their creation by God out of nothing should then have an impact 
on how people treat one another and the created world in which we live. No longer 
can one see the world and other human beings as being for one's own subjection and 
use; now, in the experience of God in and through what is other, one must see oneself 
at the service of God in and through service to God's creation. This concept will be 
developed in the section on Rahner's understanding of the unity of love of God and 
love of neighbor. 
For Nishitani, however, the reality of the world is that many do not move beyond 
nihilism, thus causing a crisis of modern culture that results in a rampant self-cen- 
teredness. One becomes caught up in a bitter circle in which nihility becomes the 
ground of a self-centeredness that results in a continual devaluation of life, and thus 
increases the experience of meaninglessness. Nishitani notes that "with the advance 
of the rationalization of life, yet standing behind it, another standpoint continues 
to gather strength: the growing affirmation of a prereflective human mode of being 
that is totally non-rational and non-spiritual, the stance of the subject that locates 
itself on nihility as it pursues its own desires unreservedly."33 Nishitani critiques the 
use of technology and the ability to manipulate the laws of nature as contributing 
to the self-centeredness ofhumankind. He extends his critique to the way in which 
countries are governed, noting that the communist governments maintain a totali- 
tarianism that results in the mechanization of institutions and of humans, while the 
liberalist governments equate the freedom of individuals with the freedom of a sub- 
ject to pursue its own desires.34 Both systems are grounded on nihility and result in a 
humanity absorbed in meaninglessness and selfishness. 
Nishitani confronts this nihilistic culture with the belief that there is a reality 
beyond nihility, and that reality is Sunyata, the emptiness that grounds the experience 
of nihility. The problem with nihilism is that it objectifies nothingness, making it 
into some "thing." 35 Nishitani explains: "nihility comes to be represented as some- 
thing outside of the existence of the self and all things, as some 'thing' absolutely 
other than existence, some 'thing' called nothingness."36 Nishitani advocates a "lived 
nothingness" that manifests itself in selflessness or the non-self instead of a nihility 
that results in selfishness. 
The idea of lived nothingness is a call to conversion in which "the negation of 
person-centeredness must amount to an existential self-negation of man as person." 37 
But for Nishitani, "in this kind of existential conversion, the self does not cease being 
a personal being. What is left behind is only the person-centered mode of being 
wherein the person is caught up in itself. In that very conversion the personal mode 
of being becomes more real, draws closer to the self, and appears in its true such- 
ness. When person-centered self-prehension isbroken down and nothingness is really 
actualized in the self, personal existence also comes really and truly to actualization 
in the self."38 It is only in the negation of the self as a wholly independent entity 
that one is able to be truly in relationship. In such a negation of self, one no longer 
understands oneself as a subject over and against all other things, things that are then 
seen as objects. Rather, one comes to understand the interrelatedness ofall things and 
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the fact hat it is precisely that interrelatedness that allows one to have and be a "self." 
The coming to awareness of one's interrelatedness is intrinsically connected to the 
experience of nihility in which one realizes that for friends and strangers alike, one 
can never know where they came from or where they are going, thus both are to the 
same degree "unknown." 39For Nishitani, this nihility occurs with a field of empti- 
ness "on which an essential encounter can take place between entities normally taken 
to be most distantly related, even at enmity with each other, no less than those that 
are most closely related."40 Ina world of increasing global conflict, one must come to 
realize that one is most oneself in recognizing one's oneness with all others, even with 
one's enemies. Thus Nishitani goes on to say that "we have here an absolute self-iden- 
tity in which the one and the other are truly themselves, atonce absolutely broken 
apart and absolutely joined together. They are an absolute two and at the same time 
an absolute one.""4 It is precisely in our differences and in the brokenness of our 
humanity that we should come to recognize our oneness. Note the similar ethical 
implications of the Christian teaching to love one's enemies and the teaching found 
in the story of the good Samaritan that one should not differentiate between people in 
deciding who is one's neighbor because all people are one's neighbor. Nishitani asserts 
that "this lack of selfishness i  what is meant by non-ego r 'emptiness' (inyata)." 42 
Sznyata, as a response to the threat of nihility in our world, must be experienced and 
lived. Having examined Nisitani's understanding of the human experience of nihility 
as grounded in iSnyata nd having seen that the result of living iunyata should be a 
self-negation that allows for a self-giving relationship with others, the next section 
turns to the theology of Karl Rahner. Nishitani provides a sound dialogue partner for 
Karl Rahner because they both ground their eligious concepts in a response to the 
human experience of meaningless found in the interdependence of all creation. 
THE INCOMPREHENSIBLE GOD OF KARL RAHNER 
Karl Rahner maintains that the "struggle against atheism is always and foremost a 
struggle against a view of God which is in danger of replacing the true, incompre- 
hensible God by a human idol."43 He also points out that an alliance of religions 
based on what they hold in common despite their divergences could be employed in 
the struggle against atheism.44 His theology makes an effort to call one back to the 
incomprehensibility of God. This theology of the incomprehensible God allows for 
a dialogue between his thought and the thought of Keiji Nishitani. The common 
ground for the two respective understandings of reality, aswas stated above, is the 
human experience of meaninglessness and the call for selflessness and self-surrender 
in the face of that meaningless. 
As Nishitani saw human existence as a question of meaning, so too does Karl 
Rahner. Rahner, like Nishitani, sees the question that human existence is as aris- 
ing from the existential experience of death and alienation. Rahner esponds to the 
human experience of meaninglessness byexplicating an understanding ofGod that 
can ground that experience in absolute meaning, thus providing the answer to the 
question that is human existence. 
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Rahner maintains that "human existence itself makes man feel lonely, as if placed 
into emptiness, as if involved in an infinite fall." 45 Rahner's understanding of the 
human experience of emptiness echoes Nishitani's understanding of the experience of 
nihility. Rahner describes the feeling of emptiness as being "surrounded by an infinite 
ocean of darkness and an immense unexplored night-always merely managing to 
survive from one contingency to another."46 Like Nishitani, Rahner also associates 
this experience with the human reality and consciousness of death. The one experi- 
ence that every human must face is death. Rahner states that the human "feels death 
living within him in the midst of his life. He feels how death is the final limit beyond 
which he himself cannot pass."47 In the face of death one begins to question the 
meaningfulness of human existence. 
Rahner also notes that the meaninglessness and selfishness of human existence 
can be the consequence of modern advances in science.48 The question that is human 
existence arises because of the contemporary situation of living in a world in which 
humans put themselves at the center, seeing all other things for their own use and 
control, even their fellow human beings. Nishitani argues that this attitude is pre- 
cisely what leads to dehumanization. Rahner notes that "we live in an age in which 
man actively manipulates the world and himself, in which the world, far from being 
thought of in concrete terms as subject to the control of heavenly powers, becomes 
the object of rational research and a quarry of arid facts from which man draws his 
materials for the construction of that world which he plans according to his own 
image and likeness, and where there seems to be room for wonder only where man 
himself is absent from the scene."49 The world that Rahner describes is one where it 
becomes harder to find any meaning because humanity is always placed at the center 
of reality instead of God. Communities of faith today must face a world in environ- 
mental crisis because of the consequences of placing all of creation at the service of 
humankind. Society at large, as well as faith communities, will struggle to balance 
the goodness of advancing scientific knowledge with the ethical implications of those 
advances in science and technology. Humans today have an unparalleled ability to 
manipulate the world around them and even manipulate humanity itself through 
advances in genetics and cloning.50 Abuses of human rights in situations of war and 
even in the market economy abound so that the destruction or devaluation of human 
life is too often simply understood as collateral damage. The result of such a world is 
a common human experience of meaninglessness. 
Ideally the existential situation of meaninglessness leads to the realization that 
by one's very nature one is a question to which there is no answer to be found other 
than the incomprehensible God. As will be explained below, the answer becomes rel- 
evant in our lived reality when one understands that for Rahner the experience of the 
incomprehensible God is mediated through one's relation to and interdependence 
with the world in which we live. Rahner notes that we can remain in the comfort 
zone where God and reality are comprehensible, but "we can do this only with the aid 
of rationalistic theory and . .. the bitterness of life's frustrations bring us up continu- 
ally against this marginal experience, so that at most we may wonder whether what is 
beyond this field of clear knowledge and autonomously practicable plans amounts to 
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a fall into an abysmal meaninglessness or to being caught up by a sheltering incom- 
prehensibility relieving us purely and simply of ourselves and our question."51 In 
other words, a rational, comprehensible id a of God falls hort in making sense out of 
the experience of nihility in life. In the end one must make a choice between trusting 
that all of life is headed toward the ultimate meaning found in the incomprehensible 
mystery of God, or giving in to a nihilistic despair.52 
For Rahner, the answer to the question of the meaninglessness of human existence 
is God. He asserts that God is meaning, but not meaning as one usually understands 
the term. It is not that which comes within our grasp, but rather the meaning that, as 
incomprehensible, grounds all concrete, comprehensible meaning.53 Rahner argues 
that "it is only in falling into an unfathomable abyss that we grasp the individual 
reality to which we can cling." 54 In Rahner's language of an abyss that grounds all of 
concrete knowledge, one is reminded of Nishitani's understanding of the emptiness 
that grounds all distinctions. 
As Nishitani explains lunyatd as absolute nearness and absolute distance, Rahner 
describes the incomprehensible God, seemingly so distant in the very fact of God's 
incomprehensibility, as precisely what is closest because it is what grounds human 
existence. One is reminded of Nishitani's image of angles to describe lnyata as the 
place where O0 is at the same time 3600. Rahner believes "the xperience that the basis 
of man's existence is the abyss: that God is essentially the inconceivable" 55is what 
grounds human transcendence. Elsewhere Rahner speaks of the human's "inescapable 
experience of the fact hat he is grounded in the abyss of the insoluble mystery" 56and 
that this mystery is to be understood asfulfilling earness. As absolute nearness, this 
mystery of God is not to be considered impersonal, even though God as personal is 
always to be understood in light of God's incomprehensibility and dissimilarity from 
ourselves.57 
For Rahner the result of the experience of understanding human existence as a 
question about the meaning of life combined with finding the answer in the incom- 
prehensible God is the need to surrender oneself to that mystery. In doing so, one 
finds oneself in a stance that is very similar to Nishitani's "non-self"--that is,in a 
stance of giving up autonomy for love. For Rahner this stance manifests itself in the 
love of one's neighbor, a love that is exemplified inJesus Christ. 
Rahner maintains that the "act in which man can allow for and accept God's 
incomprehensibility . . . is the act of self-surrendering lovetrusting entirely in this 
very incomprehensibility, in which knowledge surpasses itself, rising to its super- 
nature, and is aware of itself only by becoming love." 58 In a world in which one 
is faced with the threat of meaninglessness, urrendering to the incomprehensible 
God that grounds all existence means recognizing the interrelatedness of all things 
and reaching out to all existence in love. Rahner fully realizes that such a trusting 
surrender isnot an easy task. In fact he states that "it is easier to let oneself all into 
one's own emptiness than into the abyss of the Blessed Mystery. But it is not more 
courageous or true." 59 In other words, nihility isan easier choice than surrendering 
to love, but it is precisely the more difficult task of surrendering to God that one is 
called to as a human person. Rahner also notes that one can never be certain if one is 
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really accepting "this 'blinding' darkness into which we plunge ourselves and become 
incomprehensible to ourselves" or if "we are ultimately taking refuge in a desperate 
act of self-assertion."60 
Rahner argues that even in one's "striving toassert oneself as autonomous," one 
always knows "the possibility of self-surrendering love,"''61 and for that reason one 
remains unhappy in one's self-autonomy. The more one asserts oneself in individu- 
alistic and autonomous ways, subjecting the world to one's own purposes, the more 
meaningless one finds the world to be. It is only in "the loving leap into the one 
possibility (accepting the incomprehensibility of God)" that "the other possibility (of 
isolated self-possession) no longer exists." 62 In surrendering oneself to God, one gives 
up the self-centeredness of eeing oneself as separate from all others, and precisely in 
this surrender to what is other one finds oneself. This surrender toGod manifests 
itself in the love of one's neighbor precisely because one now understands oneself as 
interrelated toall things through God. Rahner explains that "the experience of life 
is an experience of other persons, one in which material objects are encountered as
elements connected with, and surrounding concrete persons and not otherwise.... 
The 'I' is always related to a 'Thou,' arising at the same moment in the 'Thou' as in 
the 'I,' experiencing itself in all cases only in its encounter with the other person." 63 
In the giving up of oneself one is able to recognize and realize one's own subjectivity 
as well as the subjectivity ofone's neighbor-a stance that is humanizing instead of 
dehumanizing.64 The danger inherent in this view remains the possibility of seeing 
the other simply as a means to one's own self-actualization and realization of one's 
subjectivity. To do so, however, would be inherently self-contradicting a d negate the 
very process that Rahner is attempting todescribe in which one finds oneself only in 
giving oneself in love. 
This giving over of oneself to the other in a way that defies all human reason is 
exemplified for Rahner in Jesus Christ. For Rahner the occurrence of this "irrational" 
love in the midst of one's everyday life is the place where "the last renunciation a d 
the last surrender to God can occur," which in turn "admits us to a participation 
in the final deed of Jesus on the cross." 65 Rahner understands the surrender tothe 
incomprehensible God that manifests itself in a selfless love of one's neighbor to be 
the ground of a personal relationship with our incomprehensible God. He states 
that 
we have to enter Jesus' fate and give ourselves over in faith, hope and love to 
his unconditional love for his fellow men and his death. We have to live and 
die with him in the empty darkness of his death. We shall then learn in his 
Spirit how to associate with God himself beyond the reality of this world, how 
to fall without perishing into this inexpressibly mysterious God, whose judg- 
ments are so incomprehensible, andhow therefore todiscover the ultimate and 
definitive r ality beyond this life. If the Christian has a personal and direct love 
for Jesus and lets Jesus' life and fate become the inner form and entelechy of 
his own life, he will inevitably find that Jesus is the way, the truth, and the life 
and that he will take him to the Father. He will also discover that he is able 
to call the incomprehensible God Father, even though e is nameless and that 
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this God, who is without a name and a way, can still be his home and give him 
eternal life.66 
This admittedly long citation provides an excellent summary of Rahner's position. 
One surrenders tothe incomprehensibility of God by entering into Jesus's uncondi- 
tional ove for humanity and his absolute surrender into God's incomprehensibility 
that culminated in his death. In doing so, one finds the meaning of human existence, 
and the God that seemed so distant in God's incomprehensibility is found to be the 
most near, Abba, the very ground of one's existence. The answer to the experience of 
nihility isto recognize that our very being is grounded in interconnectedness. Rahner 
concludes that "on the one hand the experience of God and the experience of self are 
one, and on the other that the experience of self and the encounter with neighbor are 
one, that all these three xperiences ultimately constitute a single reality with three 
aspects mutually conditioning one another." 67 When a faith community is grounded 
in the oneness of self, other, and God, a countercultural approach to issues of individ- 
ualism, materialism, human exploitation, and the future of the created world emerges 
that takes as its starting point that one's own well-being, and in fact one's very exis- 
tence, is dependent on the well-being and existence of the other. 
CONCLUSION 
In looking at the theologies of Keiji Nishitani and Karl Rahner, one finds a point 
of connection at which a dialogue can occur between a Buddhist and a Christian. 
This point of connection isthe common human experience of contemporary culture 
that makes one question the ultimate purpose and meaning of life. Both theolo- 
gians respond with an understanding ofreality, Sinyata nd an incomprehensible 
God respectively, that grounds human existence and encompasses the emptiness that 
human persons experience. When one accepts either understanding ofreality, the 
result is a surrender of self to that reality that manifests itself in an interdependence 
with and a radical ove for all of humanity. 
In looking at these similarities between Rahner's concept of God and Nishitani's 
concept of emptiness, it is important toremember that here cannot be a strict identity 
between the two concepts of reality. One important distinction tomaintain between 
Rahner and Nishitani is that while Nishitani's primary metaphor is emptiness that 
surrounds the emptiness in the human person, Rahner's primary metaphor is abso- 
lute fullness as that which fills the emptiness in the human person. The distinction 
is important, but not one that puts the two concepts in opposition to one another, 
especially considering Nishitani's understanding that absolute mptiness i absolute 
fullness, and Rahner's description of the absolute fullness as an abyss. 
Interreligious dialogue should not aim for a uniform concept of reality. The goal 
is not that all religions be identical, but rather that all religions be respectful ofone 
another's differences while together seeking to further the common good of human- 
ity. To that end it is helpful to put Rahner and Nishitani in dialogue with one another 
in order to give a response to the experience of meaninglessness in contemporary 
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culture, an experience that too often results in dehumanization a d violence instead 
of love. 
APPENDIX: SUNYATA IN BUDDHISM68 
Buddhism is a religion that has seen not only the development ofthought that occurs 
over time, but the development that results from the transplantation of thought into 
different cultures. Buddhism has developed both chronologically and geographically. 
The religion began in India during the 6th century BCE with the man Siddhartha 
Gautama, a Hindu who became known as the Buddha or the awakened/enlightened 
one and who advocated "the middle way" between a life in the world and a life of 
asceticism.69' The roots of the concept of iunyata, or emptiness, can be found in the 
early Buddhist concepts of anatman and pratityasamtpda- that is, non-self and 
dependent co-origination.70 These two concepts advocate a mutual interdependence 
of all that exists and a negation of self as an independent subject. Hans Waldenfels 
describes them in correlation as "the idea that there is no such thing as an indepen- 
dent, self-supporting world substance; instead all beings in the world, in virtue of 
their dependency, have their being from and in dependency on one another." 71 
The concept of Sinyata, incorporating the concepts of non-self and dependent 
co-origination, is given a central role in Buddhist hought and practice by the second 
century CE Mah~yana Buddhist philosopher Ngarjuna in the Mdhyamika school 
of Buddhism. Sinyata is understood in this chool as absolute negation, including the 
negation of negation. All concepts are empty of meaning in the Madhyamika school 
including the concept of s'unyatd, therefore even to say Sunyat is false. It is the idea 
of "not this, not that." As soon as one thinks one has understood, one has proved the 
level of one's misunderstanding. Abraham Vilez de Cea explains that for Nagarjuna 
idnyata has both a cognitive and an affective intent in which the "cognitive abandon- 
ment and relinquishing ofviews of absolute identity isinseparable from the affective 
cessation of attachment tothe absolute identity of persons and things."72 As Gregory 
Ornatowski points out, for Nagarjuna idnyata has a mainly sotierological function.73 
In other words, the concept has a practical intent, which is to negate all concepts ofan 
"absolute reality" in order that his followers might experience absolute reality. Orna- 
towski states that "for Nagarjuna 'emptiness' was thus ultimately a soteriological aid 
toward enlightenment, ot a philosophy itself. By denying all points of view it was 
the assertion that only meditation and nonattachment to any views was the answer. 
Any attempt o construct a philosophy, especially a Western-style one, based upon 
emptiness hould be impossible if one remains true to what seems to be Nagrjuna's 
original intent. This is the fundamental contradiction within the thought of these 
three Kyoto-school philosophers [Nishida, Nishitani, and Abe]." 4 For this reason, it 
is important to make a distinction between the original concept of idnyat found in 
the work of Nagarjuna nd the way the concept came to be understood in the Kyoto 
school.75 The Kyoto school, however, isdrawing not simply on the concept of sunyatd 
as it was understood by Ngarjuna, but on the way it has been historically and geo- 
graphically developed. Within the Madhyamika school itself"Absolute R ality came 
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to be ascribed to such notions as tathatd (suchness), tathgatagarbha (womb of Bud- 
dhahood), and dharmakdya (absolute truth body of the Buddha) and was viewed 
as what 'remained' after the radical 'emptying' of all things' substantive nature,"''76 
despite the fact that Naigarjuna himself never used these terms. 
One of the schools that developed out of the Madhyamika school is the Yogacara 
school (ca. 300 CE). The texts of this school become the focus of the Chinese Ch'an 
school (Zen in Japan). What is important to note in this development is that in 
the Yogacara school, Nagarjuna's concept of emptiness becomes identified with pure 
consciousness.7 Along with the Yogicara texts, Zen emphasizes the older Wisdom 
Sutras that teach the formula form is emptiness and emptiness i form.7" Intranslat- 
ing Nishitani's work, Van Bragt notes that "form" can be understood as"thing" in this 
equation and is related to Nishitani's formula of being is nothingness and nothing- 
ness is being.79 
Having traced the important aspects of the concept of emptiness in the Buddhist 
lineage down to the Zen school, one arrives at the Kyoto school, to which Nishi- 
tani belongs. The Kyoto school simply designates "a way of philosophizing-more 
a philosophical ethos than a unified system of thought--which developed in the 
department of philosophy and religion at the State University ofKyoto under the 
initial inspiration of Kitaro Nishida (1870-1945)." s80 Van Bragt describes the Kyoto 
school's basic characteristics as "a thoroughgoing loyalty to its own traditions, a com- 
mitted openness to Western traditions, and a deliberate attempt o bring about a 
synthesis of East and West." '81 It is in the context of this history that one can look at 
the concept of emptiness in Keiji Nishitani's work Religion and Nothingness. 
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